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1 Introduction
The last several decades have seen a shift away from a fully rational paradigm of financial
markets towards one in which investor behavior is influenced by psychological biases. One
of the main factors contributing to this evolution is a body of evidence showing how psycho-
logical bias affects the behavior of economic actors. Another main factor is an accumulation
of evidence that is hard to reconcile with fully rational models of security market trading
volumes and returns. In particular, asset markets exhibit trading volumes that are high,
while individuals and asset managers trade aggressively, even when such trading results in
high risk and low net returns. Moreover, asset prices display patterns of predictability that
are difficult to reconcile with rational expectations based theories of price formation.
In this paper, we discuss the role of overconfidence as an explanation for these patterns.
Overconfidence means having mistaken valuations and believing in them too strongly. It
might seem that actors in liquid financial markets should not be very susceptible to overcon-
fidence, because return outcomes are measurable, providing extensive feedback. However,
overconfidence has been documented among experts and professionals, including those in the
finance profession. For example, overconfidence is observed among corporate financial offi-
cers (Ben-David, Graham and Harvey 2013) and among professional traders and investment
bankers (Glaser, Langer and Weber 2013). People tend to be overoptimistic about their life
prospects (Weinstein 1980), and this optimism directly affects their financial decisions (Puri
and Robinson 2007).
We do not mean to suggest that overconfidence is the only phenomenon worth considering
in behavioral finance, nor that it should serve as an all-purpose explanation for all financial
anomalies. But overconfidence seems likely to be a key factor in financial decision making.
Overconfidence is a widespread psychological phenomenon (as discussed by Malmendier and
Taylor in their overview for this symposium), and is associated with a cluster of related
effects. For example, it includes overplacement—overestimation of one’s rank in a population
on some positive dimension—and overprecision—overestimation of the accuracy of one’s
beliefs. An example is overestimation of one’s ability to predict the stock market’s future
returns. A cognitive process that helps support overconfident beliefs is self-attribution bias,
in which people give credit their own talents and abilities for past successes, while blaming
their failures on bad luck.
To evaluate the importance of overconfidence for financial markets, we proceed as follows.
We start by reviewing two of the primary financial market anomalies at odds with rational
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agent asset pricing theories: the arguments that trading volumes are excessive and the
evidence that security returns are in some ways predictable. We then sketch a sequence of
models of investor trading and security prices that include various aspects of overconfidence,
with increasing complexity, and discuss the empirical implications of each of these models.
We hope that this presentation will clarify which aspects of the model are important in
delivering specific empirical implications. Finally, we offer some conclusions about how
overconfidence contributes to our understanding of financial markets.
2 Evidence on Trading Patterns and Return Predictabil-
ity
The notion of market efficiency, as explained in Fama (1970), is based on the idea that when
investors in frictionless asset markets compete with one another, securities will be correctly
priced to fully reflect all publicly available information. More generally, rationality on the
part of investors has some strong implications.
With surprisingly mild theoretical assumptions, one can show that rational individuals
should not agree to disagree. Intuitively, if we start with the same prior beliefs, yet now we
disagree, this suggests that at least one party has information that the other party should be
taking more fully into account (Aumann 1976). In a similar spirit, rational investors should
not place bets with each other; the fact that another investor is willing to take the opposite
side of my trade should suggest to me that this investor knows something I do not know
(Grossman 1976, Milgrom and Stokey 1982, Tirole 1982). For this reason, leading rational
frictionless models of asset pricing—at least in their most simple versions—imply that after
a single round of trading everyone should hold the market portfolio. Investors should not bet
against each other, each expecting to beat his counterparties. However, we clearly observe
high volumes of trade in financial markets.
Moreover, in an efficient market, a trading strategy based on existing information can-
not be used to earn abnormal profits. If such trading strategies do exist there is a return
anomaly: such opportunities suggest either that rational agents are not fully exploiting avail-
able profit opportunities, or that risk aversion or market frictions constrain their ability to
do so. However, it is now a well-accepted empirical finding—even by those who adhere
to a rational-actors explanation—that asset markets do display strong patterns of return
predictability. This finding poses a challenge to the hypothesis that investors are ratio-
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nal, because it suggests that investors are making mistakes: they are throwing away money
buying overpriced securities that subsequently do poorly, and are missing out on buying
underpriced securities that subsequently do well. An alternative explanation for return pre-
dictability is that it results from some kind of risk premia—risky assets predictably return
more than less risky ones. This explanation then raises the question of whether plausible
levels of risk aversion are high enough to explain the size of the predictability, a question we
address below.
In this section, we will explore the evidence on high trading volumes and predictable
returns in greater depth and discuss how overconfidence-based explanations provide some
insight into these patterns
2.1 Disagreement, Speculative Trade, and Trading Volume
A financial trade requires that two parties agree to disagree, in the sense that at a given
price one party believes it is a good idea to sell the asset while the other party believes it
is a good idea to buy it. Of course, there are possible reasons for informed agents to trade
other than disagreement, such as liquidity motives (such as sending a child to college), or to
rebalance to achieve a more diversified portfolio (for example, after a shock to one’s labor
income or human capital). Speculative trade can arise in rational models if investors in
securities markets are periodically required to sell or buy securities as a result of liquidity
shocks. Several models starting with Grossman and Stiglitz (1976) have shown that if there
are random shocks to security supply (designed to capture the idea that there are investors
whose need to cash out of their positions is unpredictable to others) this can add enough
noise to make room for some speculative trading.
But such motives for trade are relatively limited, and do not seem to explain the mag-
nitudes of trade, or the willingness of investors to incur the large transaction costs that
they sometimes need to pay to make such trades. The total volume of trade in financial
markets is vast. Over the period 1980-2014, the annualized average turnover for the 500
largest US stocks has averaged 223 percent, or just over $100 billion per day. Over the year
2014, the total dollar trade in these top 500 stocks was $29.5 trillion (Collin-Dufresne and
Daniel 2014)—nearly double the US GDP. Trade in foreign exchange is even larger. Froot
and Thaler (1990) report that, as of 1989, average trading in the foreign exchange market
was about $430 billion per day as compared to daily US GDP of $22 billion and daily trades
in goods and services of $11 billion.
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Figure 1. Monthly turnover and annual performance of individual investors. The white 
bar (black bar) represents the gross (net) annualized geometric mean return for February 1991 
through January 1997 for individual investor quintiles based on monthly turnover, the average 
individual investor, and the S&P 500. The net return on the S&P 500 Index Fund is that earned 
by the Vanguard Index 500. The gray bar represents the monthly turnover. 
investment style and from time-series regressions that employ either the 
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) or the three-factor model developed by 
Fama and French (1993) as our benchmark. 
Our descriptive analysis provides several additional conclusions that are 
noteworthy: 
1. Households2 trade common stocks frequently. The average household 
turns over more than 75 percent of its common stock portfolio annually. 
2. Trading costs are high. The average round-trip trade in excess of $1,000 
costs three percent in commissions and one percent in bid-ask spread. 
3. Households tilt their investments toward small, high-beta stocks. There 
is a less obvious tilt toward value (high book-to-market) stocks. 
2 Throughout this paper, "households" and "individual investors" refer to households and 
investors with discount brokerage accounts. Though we believe that our findings generalize to 
customers at other discount brokerages, we suspect that the trading practices of retail custom- 
ers differ. Some of our sample households may have both retail and discount accounts. In these 
cases, our observations are limited to their discount accounts. 
Source: Barber and Odean (2000), Figure 1. The white bar (black bar) represents the gross (net) annualized
geometric mean return for February 1991 through January 1997 for individual investor quintiles based on
mont ly turnover (grey bar). The net return on the S&P 500 Fund is that earned by the Vanguard Index
500.
Theories about rational traders reacting to liquidity shocks don’t seem sufficient to ex-
plain the magnitudes of financial trades that we observe, or the patterns in trading volume.
Rather, several findings point t overconfidence as a likely explanation. Everyday experience
suggests that there is considerable disagreement across individuals in the economy, with each
individual believing that he or she is correct. In overconfidence-based models, investors who
are overconfident form judgments about the value of a security that put too much weight
on their own views, and insufficient weight on the views of other investors (as reflected in
the security’s price). As a result, overconfident invest rs expec high p ofits from trading on
their opinions..
The excessive trading of individual investors can be called the active investing puzzle.
Individual investors trade individual stocks actively, and on average lose money by doing so.
The more actively investors trade, the more they typically lose (Odean 1999). In particular,
Barber and Odean (2000) find that in a sample of trades of 78,000 clients of a large discount
brokerage firm from 1991-1996, some households trade much more than others. The turnover
and gross- and net-returns to the clients in different turnover quintiles are summarized in
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Figure 1, reproduced from their paper. The gray bars give the average monthly turnover of
the accounts in each quintile. Strikingly, the average monthly turnover in the fifth quintile is
over 20 percent per month. The white bars give gross returns (that is, without accounting for
the costs associated with trading) and show that, across quintiles, there is little variation in
average gross returns. However, the black bars show that the net returns are quite different.
The high-turnover investors pay large fees, given their high volume of trade, which drives
down their net returns. The net returns of all quintiles except the lowest are lower than the
net return from investing in a Standard & Poor’s 500 index fund.
Tests that aggregate across individual investors also find that the stocks that individual
investors buy tend to subsequently underperform. Investor losses can be astonishingly large;
in the aggregate, the annual losses of Taiwanese individual investors amount to 2.2 per-
cent of Taiwan’s gross domestic product and 2.8 percent of total personal income (Barber,
Odean and Zhu 2009). In experimental markets as well, some investors overestimate the
precision of their signals, are more subject to the winner’s curse, and have inferior trading
performance (Biais et al. 2005). Greater ease of trading gives investors free rein to harm
themselves by more aggressive trading, as occurred with the rise of online trading (Barber
and Odean 2002, Choi, Laibson and Metrick 2002). A similar point applies to individuals
who invest in active mutual funds instead of index funds for better net-of-fees performance.
Indeed, the existence of actively managed mutual fund that charge high fees without provid-
ing correspondingly high gross performance provides evidence that a number of individual
investors are overconfident about their ability to select the high-performing active fund man-
agers (French 2008, Malkiel 2013)
A range of evidence from a wide variety of sources suggests that overconfidence pro-
vides a natural explanation for the active investing puzzle, because it causes investors to
trade more aggressively even in the face of transactions costs or adverse expected payoffs
(Odean 1998). In one of the rare studies of investor trading that measures overconfidence
directly, Grinblatt and Keloharju (2009) associate the trading behavior of Finnish investors
with the results of a psychometric test given to all Finnish males at age 19 or 20. The study
finds that overconfident investors (as well as investors who are prone to sensation seeking)
trade more often. In a different study consistent with overconfidence as an explanation for
the active investing puzzle, Kelley and Tetlock (2013) construct a structural model of market
trading which includes informed rational investors as well as uninformed investors who trade
either for hedging reasons, or to make an (overconfident) bet on perceived information. They
estimate this model using a dataset on trades, prices and information releases for US traded
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firms, and conclude that, without overconfidence-based trading, volumes would be smaller
by a factor of 100. Finally, motivated by psychological evidence that men are more overconfi-
dent than women in decision domains traditionally perceived as masculine, such as financial
matters, Barber and Odean (2001) compare the trading behavior and performance of men
and women. Consistent with higher confidence, the average turnover for accounts opened
by men is about 1.5 times higher than accounts opened by women, and as a result men pay
0.94 percent per year in higher transaction costs. The gross (benchmark-adjusted) returns
of the men in the sample are lower, though this difference is not statistically significant. As
a result, the net-of-fees returns of men are far lower.
Other aspects of investor trading behavior are also consistent with overconfidence and
the psychological processes that accompany it. Individual investors tend to trade more after
they experience high stock returns. For example, early adopters of online trading tended to
make the switch after unusually good personal performance, and subsequently traded more
actively (Barber and Odean 2002, Choi, Laibson and Metrick 2002). This connection may
help to explain why stock market trading volume increase after high returns, as has been
documented in a large number of countries (Griffin, Nardari and Stulz 2007). For example,
annualized turnover in US common stocks was at levels of over 100 percent late in the bull
market of the 1920s, fell through the 1930s and 1940s, and then rose dramatically from
the 1990s up through the financial crisis of 2007-2008 (Collin-Dufresne and Daniel 2014).
Statman, Thorley and Vorkink (2006) find that US market turnover is positively correlated
with lagged monthly market returns, and that turnover of individual securities is positively
associated with lagged market turnover (after controlling for past values of turnover and
returns in each security).
How can these patterns of overconfidence and high turnover persist over time, despite
the high risks and costs they impose upon investors? Overconfidence in general is supported
by bias in self-attribution, as modeled by Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (1998) and
Gervais and Odean (2001); investors who have experienced high returns attribute this to
their high skill, and become more overconfident, while investors who experience low returns
attribute it to bad luck, rather than experiencing an offsetting fall in their overconfidence
level.
Overconfidence is likely to be especially important when security markets are less liquid,
and when short-selling is difficult or costly. When short-selling is constrained, pessimists
about a stock find it harder to trade on their views than optimists. If some of the optimists
do not adequately take into account that pessimists are sidelined by short-sale constraints,
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the optimists will overvalue the stock, resulting in equilibrium overpricing. Thus, when
overconfidence is combined with short sales constraints, we expect the security to become
overpriced (Miller 1977).
Motivated by this hypothesis, Diether, Malloy and Scherbina (2002) document that firms
for which the analysts disagree more—measured by the dispersion in analysts’ forecasts of
the firm’s future earnings—on average earn lower returns. This finding is usually interpreted
as evidence that investor disagreement matters; overconfidence provides a natural explana-
tion for why disagreement exists and matters. Because volatility creates greater scope for
disagreement, this approach also suggests overpricing of more volatile stocks. Consistent
with this insight, Ang et al. (2006, 2009) and Baker, Bradley and Wurgler (2011) show that
high idiosyncratic-volatility stocks earn lower subsequent returns than low volatility stocks.
This hypothesis is also consistent with the finding that stocks and other assets with high
systematic risk (i.e. high market beta) typically earn too low a return premium relative
to the risk-return tradeoff implied by equilibrium models such as the Capital Asset Pricing
Model (Black, Jensen and Scholes 1972, Frazzini and Pedersen 2014),
During the high-tech boom at the turn of the millennium, episodes of strong disagreement
in which, remarkably, the market value of a parent firm was sometimes substantially less than
the value of its holdings in one of its publicly-traded divisions (Lamont and Thaler 2003).
Such patterns reflected the fact that an optimistic set of investors were excited about the
prospect of a glamorous division, and the relatively pessimistic investors who were setting
the price of the parent firm found it too costly or troublesome to short-sell the glamorous
division to bring its price in line with that of the parent. Also consistent with overvaluation
induced by investor disagreement, stocks with tighter short-sale constraints have stronger
return predictability (Nagel 2005). Such asymmetry between the long and the short side of
return anomalies is especially strong during optimistic periods, when overvaluation is most
severe (Stambaugh, Yu and Yuan 2012).
Overconfident disagreement, combined with short sale constraints, can also cause dy-
namic patterns of increasing overpricing. Building on Harrison and Kreps (1978), Scheinkman
and Xiong (2003) present a model in which overconfidence generates disagreement among
agents regarding asset fundamentals. Owing to short sale constraints, investors buy stocks
that they know to be overvalued in the hope of selling at even higher prices to more opti-
mistic buyers. This magnifies the pricing effects of disagreement. Such bubbles should be
more severe in markets with lower available supply of shares (“float”) (Hong, Scheinkman
and Xiong 2006), as seems to have occurred during a bubble in Chinese warrants (Xiong and
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Yu 2011).
Although overconfidence causes problems in markets, it brings some benefits, as well.
Overconfidence can induce investors to investigate more, and/or to trade more aggressively
based on their signals. This sometimes results in greater incorporation of information into
price (Hirshleifer, Subrahmanyam and Titman 1994, Kyle and Wang 1997, Odean 1998, Hir-
shleifer and Luo 2001). Furthermore, overconfidence encourages investors to participate in
asset classes, such as the stock market or international investing, that they might otherwise
neglect (owing to concerns such as fear of the unfamiliar). Empirically, a greater feeling of
competence about investing is associated with more active trading and with greater willing-
ness to invest in foreign stock markets (Graham, Harvey and Huang 2009).
2.2 Return Predictability
Here, we lay out the documented patterns in return predictability that are at odds with the
efficient markets hypothesis and potentially attributable to overconfidence. We first concen-
trate primarily on the nature and direction of the patterns, as opposed to their magnitudes.
Of course, it is possible that the abnormal returns generated by “anomaly portfolios” based
on patterns of predictable returns are not anomalous at all. A strategy may earn high returns
relative to some benchmark by virtue of exposure to some systematic risk factor that the
benchmark does not capture. (A factor in the asset pricing literature refers to a statistical
source of common variation in security returns—usually the return on a portfolio. For ex-
ample, the returns of individual stocks can be explained in part by realizations of the stock
market as a whole, as is verified by regressing stock returns on the market portfolio.) In
the next subsection, we will argue that the large premia earned by a combination of these
anomaly-based strategies is too large to be explained plausibly in this way. We consider
evidence on return predictability of three types: (1) predictability based on the market price
of the firm, scaled by measures of fundamental value; (2) predictability based on a recent his-
tory of past returns (momentum and reversal); and (3) predictability based on underreaction
to, or neglect of, public information about fundamentals.
One of the earliest anomalies uncovered in academic research was the size anomaly (Banz
1981, Keim 1983)—the phenomenon that “small” firms, defined in terms of low-market-
capitalization, earn higher returns than large firms. Even stronger predictability is obtained
when scaling the firm’s market capitalization by a measure of the firm’s fundamental value.
Fama and French (1992) find that the book-to-market ratio—that is, the book-value of equity,
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scaled by the firm’s market capitalization—predicts returns. In particular, so-called “value
firms” with high book-to-price ratio firms substantially outperform “growth firms” with
low book-to-price ratios. Many other fundamental-to-price measures, including earnings-
to-price, sales-to-price, and cash-flow-to-price ratios, also positively forecast future returns
(Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny 1994).
A pattern of long-term price reversal (DeBondt and Thaler 1985) can also be understood
as related to the fundamental-to-price ratio. Intuitively, a stock that is mispriced now
probably did not share the same mispricing years ago. Daniel and Titman (2006) add
an additional dimension to this point; if past long-term returns are decomposed into a
component associated with public-information and an orthogonal component, a long-term
reversal of prices is only observed for the orthogonal component. The component of the past
return associated with public information does not reverse.
post-earnings announcement drift or earnings momentum is the phenomenon in which
firms that announce high earnings relative to forecasts, or whose price jumps up on an
announcement date, tend to earn high returns over the subsequent 3-6 months (Bernard and
Thomas 1989, Bernard and Thomas 1990). Price momentum is the tendency for returns over
the past 3-12 months to continue in the same direction in the future in many asset classes. A
related but distinct phenomenon is The overconfidence explanation for momentum involves
a pattern of continuing overreaction and slow correction.
More specifically, price momentum in the US stock market has several key features. First,
it is predominantly associated with lagged price changes that can be attributed to public
information releases. In contrast, price changes that cannot be associated with news tend
to exhibit reversal rather than continuation (Chan 2003, Tetlock 2011). Second, in the long
run momentum tends to reverse (Griffin, Ji and Martin 2003, Jegadeesh and Titman 2011).
Third, momentum effects are weak for value stocks, but strong for growth stocks (Daniel
and Titman 1999). Fourth, momentum strategies generate especially strong returns in calm
periods when the past return on the market is high (Cooper and Hameed 2004, Daniel and
Moskowitz 2015), but exhibit strong negative skewness and earn lower returns in turbulent
(high volatility) bear markets (Daniel and Moskowitz 2015, Daniel, Jagannathan and Kim
2015).
Asness, Moskowitz and Pedersen (2013), among many others, document strong value and
momentum anomalies in non-US data, and in other asset classes including currencies, com-
modity futures and government bonds. Moskowitz (2015) shows that the same momentum
and value/reversal patterns observed in other asset classes are also present in sports betting
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venues. Sports betting markets are a useful test-bed for overconfidence-based theories be-
cause the outcomes of these contests are unlikely to be interdependent with other economic
outcomes that may affect the marginal utility of individuals. Moskowitz argues that the
presence of value and momentum effects in sports betting markets is consistent with delayed
overreaction theories of asset pricing. Consistent with the model in Daniel, Hirshleifer and
Subrahmanyam (2001), he finds that higher ambiguity predicts stronger momentum and
value returns, consistent with what is observed in financial markets. .
Many items reported in financial statements can be useful in forecasting the future earn-
ings, but investors do not appear to make full use of such information. One prominent
example is “operating accruals,” which are the accounting adjustments made to a firm’s
cash flows to obtain earnings, a standard measure of profitability. Such adjustments may
include sales transactions whose payments have not yet arrived or expense transactions for
which actual payments have not yet been made. Sloan (1996) shows that market prices don’t
fully reflect the extent to which earnings arise from cash flows or accruals.
A common pattern in event studies is continuation of the event-date return, so that events
that are on average good news experience high subsequent returns, and the opposite for bad
news events (see the summary in Hirshleifer (2001)). For example, the issuance of new
securities tends to convey bad news about future cash flows, while the repurchase of existing
securities tends to convey good news. Consistent with return continuation, repurchases tend
to be followed over a long period by high returns (Ikenberry, Lakonishok and Vermaelen
1995), and equity and debt issues in many countries by negative abnormal returns (Loughran
and Ritter 1995, Spiess and Aﬄeck-Graves 1995, Henderson, Jegadeesh and Weisbach 2006).
Daniel and Titman (2006) and Pontiff and Woodgate (2008) develop more comprehensive
measures of share issuance over a given time period, and show that lagged measure of issuance
strongly forecast returns. At the aggregate level as well, the share of equity issues in total
new equity and debt issues has been a negative predictor of US stock market returns (Baker
and Wurgler 2000).
2.3 Return Predictability—Magnitudes
The return patterns documented in the preceding section might reflect certain kinds of
rational risk premia, rather than mistakes or biases on the part of investors. Here, we
summarize evidence on the risk and rewards of strategies based upon these effects to see if
this explanation is plausible. A portfolio which simultaneously exploits several the patterns
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of return predictability documented in the preceding section generates an exceptionally high
reward-to-risk ratio. Using insights from Hansen and Jagannathan (1997), accommodating
these premia within any frictionless rational expectations model would require extreme (and
we will argue, unrealistic) variation in investor marginal utility across states of the world.
We start with a set of seven “zero-investment” portfolios designed to capture the return
predictability patterns described in the preceding section.
First, the “Small Minus Big” portfolio, or SMB, proposed by Fama and French (1993),
captures the difference in average returns between small and large market-capitalization
firms. This portfolio, at the beginning of each month, takes a long position in $1 worth of
small-market-capitalization stocks, financed by taking a short position in $1 worth of large-
market capitalization stocks. Historically, investors should have been able capture the returns
of this zero-investment or $1-long/$1-short portfolio with minimal transaction costs (despite
the need to sell short). This portfolio has been used in numerous academic studies, and
yearly, monthly and daily returns from 1926 on are available on Kenneth French’s website.
Second, the “High minus Low” or HML portfolio is formed to exploit the persistently
higher returns of stocks with high book-to-market ratios and those with low book-to-market
ratios. The portfolio involves buying value stocks—stocks with ratios of book-value of eq-
uity to market-value of equity in the top 30 percent of all stocks on the New York Stock
Exchange—and shorting growth stocks, with book-to-market ratios in the bottom 30 percent.
Third, the “Up minus Down” or UMD portfolio is a price momentum portfolio (Carhart
(1997), Fama and French (1993)). It is formed by buying stocks that rose in price in the
previous time period (often 12 months) and taking a short position in stocks that declined
in price in the previous time period. Thus, it is based on momentum in stock prices.
Fourth, the “ISsUance” or ISU portfolio buys a value-weighted portfolio of firms that
over the preceding three years repurchased stock, and shorts a portfolio of stocks that issued
new equity, based on the Daniel and Titman (2006) measure.
Fifth, the “ACcRual” or ACR portfolio goes long a portfolio of firms which had the lowest
the ratio of accruals to earnings over the past year, and goes short on the firms which had
the highest accruals.
Sixth, the “Betting-Against-Beta” or BAB portfolio is constructed following the descrip-
tion in Frazzini and Pedersen (2014). The long side of the portfolio is a leveraged portfolio
of low-beta stocks. The portfolio takes a short position in high-beta stocks.
Finally, the “Idiosyncratic-VOLatility” or IVOL portfolio each month takes a long po-
sition in the set of firms that had the lowest idiosyncratic volatility of daily returns over
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Table 1: Anomaly-Based Strategy Sharpe Ratios
This table presents the realized ex-post optimal strategy Sharpe-ratios from 1963:07-2014:05 for a set of
long-short portfolios based on a set of anomalies taken from the finance literature: Mkt-Rf, SMB, HML
are the three Fama and French (1993) portfolios; UMD is the Carhart (1997) price momentum portfolio;
“ISsUance” (ISU) and “ACcRual” (ACR) are long-short portfolios based on the Daniel and Titman (2006)
cumulative issuance and Sloan (1996) accruals measures, respectively; BAB is the Frazzini and Pedersen
(2014) Betting-Against-Beta portfolio; and finally IVOL is the Ang et al. (2006) idiosyncratic-volatility
portfolio.
Portfolio Weights (%) Sharpe
Mkt-Rf SMB HML UMD ISU ACR BAB IVOL Ratio
100.0 − − − − − − − 0.39
34.9 18.7 46.4 − − − − − 0.76
25.8 10.5 33.0 30.7 − − − − 1.07
8.0 4.5 33.9 17.7 26.8 9.1 − − 1.37
7.7 12.4 13.8 4.5 18.0 10.2 9.5 24.0 1.78
the preceding one month, and shorts the highest idiosyncratic volatility stocks, measured
following the procedure specified in Ang et al. (2006).
In working with these portfolios, remember that the “Sharpe Ratio” of a portfolio is
the ratio of its reward to its risk. More specifically, we define it here to be the ratio of
the annualized excess return on the portfolio to the annualized return standard deviation
of the portfolio. To summarize how an investor might exploit these anomalies, it is useful
to examine the Sharpe ratios achieved by combining the anomaly portfolios into super-
portfolios.
Table 1 presents Sharpe ratios for portfolios consisting of the US market portfolio—
specifically the Center for Research in Security Prices value-weighted index return—along
with various mixtures of the seven candidate anomaly portfolios.1 Each row of Table 1
represents a different combination of the set of anomaly portfolios designed to achieve a high
Sharpe ratio. The first eight columns show the weights on each of the anomaly portfolios,
and the number in the ninth (and last) column gives the annualized Sharpe ratio of the
overall portfolio that combines them. The component portfolios are normalized so that each
of has the same volatility over the 1963:07-2014:05 sample period. Thus, the weights given
in the table are proportional to the volatility of that component.
The first row of the table shows that during this sample period, a portfolio that was
1Mkt-Rf is the notation used by Fama and French (1993) for the excess return of the CRSP value weighted
index, relative to the 1-month US treasury-bill return in the same month.
12
100 percent invested in the market index (Mkt-RF) experienced an annualized Sharpe ratio
of 0.39. Specifically, the annualized return, net of the one-month Treasury-bill rate, was 6
percent, and the annualized volatility was 15.5 percent. The second row shows how much an
investor could have improved on the market Sharpe Ratio by also investing in the size-based
SMB and value-based HML portfolios. The optimal combination of these three portfolios
results in a Sharpe ratio of 0.76, a vast improvement relative to the market portfolio on its
own. The next few lines of the table show that the ability to invest in the momentum factor
brings the Sharpe ratio up to 1.07, and the ability to invest in the issuance and accrual
portfolios brings it up further to 1.37. Finally, if the investor had been free to invest in any
of these eight portfolios, and knew beforehand the distribution of returns over this period
(not the returns themselves but only the distribution), that investor could have earned a
Sharpe ratio of 1.78, more than four times higher than that of the market.
The numbers presented in this table are the Sharpe ratios for the optimal portfolios,
calculated as if investors knew up front the realized distribution of returns. But our main
conclusions still apply if investor do not have full foreknowledge of distributions. For ex-
ample, an equal-weighted combination of the eight portfolios (weights which do not require
assumptions about future performance of an of the portfolios) earns an annualized Sharpe-
ratio of 1.54. Similarly, Asness, Moskowitz and Pedersen (2013) document that a 50/50
combination of only the value and momentum portfolios, but diversified across different
regions and asset classes, produces an annualized Sharpe ratio of 1.59.
Any asset-pricing model—whether rational or behavioral—needs to explain why investors
are apparently passing up these very high-return, low volatility investments. In a rational
expectations setting, asset premia arise only when the asset’s returns are risky, meaning that
returns are high when the investor is relatively rich (and marginal utility of wealth is low)
and are low when the investor is poor (and marginal utility is high). To explain the such a
large Sharpe ratio, marginal utility must be quite variable. The Hansen and Jagannathan
(1991) bound shows that, to explain the existence of a portfolio with a Sharpe-ratio of 1.8
requires that the annualized standard deviation in marginal utility growth be almost as large
or larger—that is, greater than approximately 170 percent. Both casual observation and
macroeconomic data suggest that marginal utility growth does not vary nearly this much.
For example, the annualized volatility of aggregate US consumption growth is 100 times
smaller (1.8 percent). Also, the macroeconomics profession is still with the equity premium
puzzle—the finding that the Sharpe ratio of the equity market portfolio, which is about 0.4
(annualized), is so high relative to the low volatility of consumption growth (Hansen and
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Singleton 1983, Mehra and Prescott 1985, Weil 1989), which seems to imply that the return
to the US equity market portfolio is much higher than can be justified by its riskiness. The
far higher Sharpe ratio associated with these anomaly portfolios is even harder to reconcile
with a rational investor model.
Perhaps an answer to these puzzles can be found in trading frictions that make it costly for
rational investors to trade to exploit perceived profit opportunities. However, the magnitude
of such frictions, as captured by bid-ask spreads, is too small to explain why investors would
forego the combination of return and risk described here. For moderate-sized trades in
large firms, such as those used to construct the zero-investment portfolios described here,
such spreads are relatively small. Alternatively, maybe these results arise from data mining,
and if one looked at different time periods, or a limited set of these portfolios, or weighted
the portfolios differently, then the pricing anomalies would disappear. One can tinker with
different time periods, or different portfolios, or different weights. But the opportunities
presented by these anomaly portfolios appear robust.
What other theories can explain the patterns in Table 1? Could it be that the decision
processes or beliefs of investors are biased in ways that induce the seven pricing anomalies
listed earlier? Overconfidence-based models suggest that the answer is “yes.” In these
models, investors continue to optimize, but do so based on incorrect beliefs about the state
probabilities. Under this explanation, investors think that the state probabilities are such
that the expected returns of the anomaly portfolios are not abnormally high, despite the
evidence in Table 1. This explanation need not presume that all investors are overconfident.
There could still be rational investors who correctly perceive the high available Sharpe ratios,
but if such investors are relatively small in number, and capital constrained, their trading
to exploit the profit opportunities will not fully eliminate them. How might overconfidence
generate the anomalies that underlie Table 1, so that overconfident investors do not believe
that these portfolios outperform? In the next section, we lay out overconfidence models that
can potentially explain these patterns.
3 Overconfidence-Based Models of Asset Price Forma-
tion
In the standard frictionless rational expectations framework, investors process information
perfectly. Thus, asset prices are always equal to rationally discounted expected cashflows,
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Figure 2: Model 1: Basic One-Signal Model—Timeline
This figure illustrates the timeline for the basic three-date, one-signal model discussed in Section 3.1. At
time 0, the investor knows only the prior distribution from which the time 2 final payoff is drawn. At time
1 the investor observes a noisy signal s. At t = 2 the payoff θ is revealed.
where discount rates are equal to rational expectations of returns. Investors earn returns
that are, on average, exactly what they expect.
As discussed in the previous section, so-called zero investment portfolios constructed to
reveal anomalies have produced high Sharpe ratios—high average excess returns with low
volatility—and which have low correlation with macroeconomic shocks that might plausibly
represent risk. Thus some researchers have turned to behavioral models in an attempt to
explain these patterns. The behavioral models rely on either non-standard preferences, or
biased beliefs.
In models with non-standard preferences, investors correctly expect that high excess
returns are achievable with these anomaly-based portfolios. In these models investors choose
not to invest more in these portfolios because they find certain kinds of risk extraordinarily
painful to bear. In contrast, biased belief models posit that investors make mistakes in the
way that they form expectations about asset payoffs. Overconfidence-based models fall into
this category.
We now provide a sequence of models that illustrate some insights of the overconfidence-
based approach. The first model is a bare-bones setting which captures the fact that an
overconfident investor overreacts to a signal that is perceived as private, resulting in overre-
action and correction, consistent with evidence of long-run return reversals. We then present
models that show how refinements to this basic model, grounded in the psychological evi-
dence on overconfidence, can plausibly generate other anomalies described above.
3.1 Model 1: One Signal
Consider a static overconfidence model, which involves a three-date, one-signal example.
Figure 2 provides a timeline. For the moment, assume that the overconfident representative
investor in the model is risk neutral. There are three dates, t ∈ {0, 1, 2}, and two securities:
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a riskfree asset with a riskfree rate of zero, and a security which will pay an uncertain
liquidating dividend θ at time 2. The prior distribution for θ is known. At t = 1, the
investor receives a private signal of the form s = θ + . In a representative agent model,
signals cannot of course be truly private, but the model can be viewed as one where there is
also a very small mass of investors who do not receive the signal. Also, labeling this signal
as “private” captures this idea that this agent believes that she has used her skill to process
information and generate new and unique insights about the payoff θ. The psychology
literature suggests that agents will be more overconfident about these “private” signals than
they will be about “public” information such as earnings announcement that are more easily
translated into estimates of future firm value. The date 1 price in this setting is a weighted
average of the prior expectation and the signal, with relative weights proportional to the
investor’s perceived precisions of the prior and of the signal.
We are interested in whether the asset return is forecastable. If the investor is rational
(not overconfident) then the price P1 is equal to the rational expectation of the payoff E[θ],
and in this case the price change from date 1 to date 2 is unforecastable—that is, it is not
correlated with any price change from time 0 to time 1, nor with the signal received in time
1. The information the signal provides for fundamental value is correctly impounded into
price at date 1, and the market is efficient.
However, if an investor overestimates the precision of the signal, that the investor will
overreact. Thus, a positive signal will cause the date 1 price to be too high, resulting in too
high a price change between dates 0 and 1. On average the price then falls back between dates
1 and 2, which is a pattern of return reversal. In contrast, if the investor underestimates the
precision of the signal, the date 1 price will underreact, and the subsequent price change will
on average be positive again for a second period, which would be a case of return momentum.
What might cause the investor’s estimate of the signal precision to differ from the true
precision? One possible answer is investor overconfidence. In the simplest version of the
Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (1998) model, the representative investor observes
only a private signal and is overconfident about that signal, resulting in price reversal.
Alternatively, in Eyster, Rabin and Vayanos (2013), investors make a different error; they
fail to infer fully the private signals received by other investors from the price. Effectively,
the representative investor underestimates the information implicit in price—namely , the
precision of the aggregate private signal. In consequence, the investor underreacts to this
signal, which implies that in equilibrium price underreacts to new information. Their model
implies price momentum, but because this is a result of pure underreaction to information,
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Figure 3: Model 2: Separate Public and Private Signals – Timeline
This figure presents the timeline for the four-date, two-signal model discussed in Section 3.2. Now, the
investor observes distinct priV ate and puBlic signals sV and sB at t = 1 and t = 2, respectively. At t = 3
the asset payoff θ is revealed.
there is no reversal.
Neither pure underreaction nor pure overreaction, as reflected in Model 1, fully captures
the return predictability evidence discussed earlier, in which there is momentum at shorter
horizons and reversal at longer horizons. In addition, Model 1 does not allow for public
information signals prior to the terminal date, and therefore does not allow consideration
of whether returns can be predicted based on public information such as the news of a new
equity issue by the firm. To capture these patterns, we need to move to a richer model.
3.2 Model 2: Public and Private Signals
In Model 2, we introduce separate public and private signals. This model is the “static-
overconfidence” model of Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (1998). The timeline for
Model 2 is given in Figure 3. There are now four dates, and two signals: sV is a priVate signal,
and sB is puBlic. The investor is overconfident, and therefore overestimates the precision of
the private signal at time 1. However, the investor correctly estimates the precision of the
public signal and the prior.
This approach delivers several additional features. First, as in Model 1, the market
overreacts to the private signal, therefore the price change from time 1 to time 3 is in
the opposite direction of the price change from time 0 to time 1. In addition, the market
underreacts to the public signal: that is, price changes are autocorrelated, cov(R2,3, R1,2) > 0.
Given this positive return autocorrelation, it is tempting to jump to the conclusion that
following the public release of good news at date 2, the share price will continue rising
between dates 2 and 3, but his turns out to be incorrect. Intuitively, consider the rationally
updated expectation of the fundamental θ conditional on the public signal. We want to
see if, on average, the date 2 price differs from this expectation. If so, the public signal
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can be used to predict the subsequent return. For example, assuming that the precisions
of the prior and public signal are equal, the prior is 0, and the public signal is 100, then
the rational updated expectation of the payoff will be 50. On average, the unbiased private
signal will 50 (the expected fundamental plus mean zero noise). So even though the private
signal is overweighted relative to the public signal in market price, there is no mispricing on
average, conditional on the public signal. On average the private signal has zero effect on
the expectation, which is a weighted average of 50. So on average there is no conditional
mispricing.2
To explain the evidence that share prices underreact to corporate announcements doc-
umented earlier, a further refinement is needed. Suppose that a good- or bad-news pub-
lic signal is an event chosen by the firm or some other party in opposition to the private
signal. For example, perhaps the firm announces a new equity issue—a bad news event—
when the firm is overvalued (that is, overconfident investors received a positive private sig-
nal). There is evidence that firms that issue equity are indeed overvalued (Loughran and
Ritter 1995, Dong, Hirshleifer and Teoh 2012). In a similar way, evidence suggests that
firms engage in repurchase—a good news event—in response to undervaluation (Ikenberry,
Lakonishok and Vermaelen 1995). We call such public signals “selective.” To the extent that
public signals are selectively undertaken in opposition to preexisting mispricing, such signals
will show return continuation, wherein the long-run return after the event is on average of
the same sign as the initial market reaction to the event. This implication is consistent with
the strong performance of the ISU (issuance) portfolio described earlier.
However, Model 2 still does not deliver the key empirical predictions that there will be
both medium-term price momentum (Jegadeesh and Titman 1993) and long-term reversal
(DeBondt and Thaler 1985). To deliver these implications we need to consider the psychology
of how overconfidence changes over time as people receive feedback from their environments.
3.3 Model 3: Dynamic Overconfidence
Confidence changes over time as people receive feedback about their judgements and de-
cisions. When people learn that their recent forecasts were accurate, they tend to revise
their confidence upward, and when they learn that they were wrong they tend to revise it
downward. However, this process is not symmetric, owing to self-attribution bias, which
2Thus, knowing the public signal does not allow one to forecast the future return from time 2 to time 3.
For the interested reader, a formal proof of this assertion is given as Appendix B.
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Figure 4: Model 3: Dynamic Overconfidence Model – Timeline
Asset Price:
Signal:
Period:
This figure illustrates the dynamic overconfidence model timeline. At time 1, the informed investors receive
a private signal sI . At each subsequent time (2, 3, . . .), the investor receives additional public signals, with
uncorrelated noise terms.
is the tendency of people to treat successes as mainly a reflection of their own skills and
failures as mainly a matter of bad luck—the “heads I win, tails it’s chance” fallacy (Langer
and Roth 1975). Self-attribution bias explains how overconfidence can persist over time.
Incorporating the dynamics of overconfidence into our price formation model allows us
to derive more realistic predictions for patterns of return continuation and reversal. To do
so, we need to give investors opportunities to update their estimate of their private signal
precision. Thus we adopt the structure illustrated in Model 3 (Figure 4), with the change
that there are now an unlimited number of public signals arriving at times 2, 3, 4, . . ..
Consistent with findings from the psychology literature, we specify that the investor’s es-
timate of private signal precision shifts through time as a function of whether the investor’s
private signal proves to be consistent with subsequently arriving public signals. This spec-
ification for confidence updating is admittedly ad hoc, but is roughly consistent with the
psychology literature. In particular, investors update their estimates of their signal accuracy
based on their historical forecast success, but in a biased way.
Think of the “cumulative public signal” as the average of all previous public signals. The
investor’s perceived precision evolves over time based on public signal arrival. The updating
rule is that when the arrival of the next public signal pushes the cumulative public signal
(and market price) in the direction of the investor’s private signal, then the investor becomes
more confident in her private signal. So the investor’s estimated signal precision increases
by a factor of 1 + k. In contrast, if the new public signal pushes the price away from the
investor’s valuation, the investor loses confidence, and the investor’s estimate of τV falls by
a factor of (1 − k). Biased self-attribution is captured by the assumption that k > k: the
investor’s estimated precision increases more with a good outcome than it decreases with a
bad outcome.
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Figure 5: Response to a unit private signal—static and dynamic overconfidence
models.
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This figure illustrates the impulse response to a private signal sV = 1 at time 1 when the true security value
is θ = 0. In this simulation the prior and private-signal precisions are equal. The dashed line illustrates the
impulse response in the static overconfidence setting. The solid line is the impulse response in the dynamic
overconfidence setting. (from Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (1998)).
Figure 5 illustrates the impulse response to to a private signal of sV =1 at time 1, when
the prior of θ¯=0, the true security value is θ=0, and the prior and private signal precisions
are equal. The dashed line illustrates the price path with static overconfidence (as presented
earlier in Model 2). Here, because of the equal precisions, the price at time 1 is 0.5—the
average of θ¯ and sV . However, starting at t = 2, with the arrival of the first public signal,
the price on average starts to decline, as the average public signal is equal to θ = 0, and
converges to the true security value of θ = 0.
The solid line in Figure 5 illustrates the average price path with dynamic overconfidence
as in Model 3). As in the static overconfidence setting, the price initially moves to P1 = 0.5.
However now, on observing the sequence of (noisy) public signals, the investor’s estimate
of her private signal precision increases, resulting in continuing overreaction to this original
signal—in this example up to about 15 periods. Eventually, as more public signals arrive,
the cumulative public signal becomes more precise and the mispricing necessarily converges
to zero. The result is a hump-shaped impulse response function. If instead we began with a
private signal that was negative, there would be a trough-shaped impulse response function—
the reflection across the x-axis of the solid line in Figure 5.
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This shape implies momentum at short lags and reversal at long lags. To build some
intuition on this point, consider the hump-shape (the long side). The upward slope in the
overreaction phase indicates that positive returns tend to be followed by positive returns.
The downward slope in the correction phase indicates there negative returns tend to be fol-
lowed by negative returns. Similar reasoning applies on the short side. In contrast, with a
long lag, a positive return on the left side of the hump tends to be followed by a negative
return in the correction phase. In sum, a model with self-attribution and dynamic shifts
in confidence implies positive short-lag autocorrelations and negative long-lag autocorrela-
tions and is therefore consistent with evidence of momentum and long-run reversal discussed
earlier. It is also consistent with the strong performance of the UMD (Up Minus Down)
momentum-based portfolio described earlier.
3.4 Models with Both Rational and Overconfident Investors
In the models so far, prices are set by overconfident investors. How would these conclusions
change were we to introduce a mass of rational investors into these models? These investors
would act as arbitrageurs, pushing prices toward fundamental values.
Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (2001) explore such a setting as an extension of
the three-date static-overconfidence model explored earlier. In this approach, the market
has a continuum of risk-averse investors, who start identical to each other. There are N
securities, and the joint distribution of their fundamental payoffs is common knowledge.
At time 1, investors receive different private signals. Some receive signals about what we
call “factor realizations”—common influences that affect the returns of all securities—while
other receive signals about what we call “residual payoff components”—the pieces of security
payoffs that are not explained by common factors.
Investors are overconfident about the signal they receive: they believe that the precision
of that signal is higher than it is actually is. However, the investors who do not receive a
signal instead infer the signal as it manifests itself through prices, assess precision correctly,
and act as arbitrageurs. Owing to risk aversion, these arbitrageurs eliminate only some of
the mispricing.
This setting yields a number of implications for the relationships between risk and return.
First, just as in the Model 2 setting, size and fundamental/price ratios are predictors of future
security returns. Size is a negative predictor, because a firm that is large in market value will
on average be large in part because it is overvalued. This ability of size to predict returns can
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help to explain the performance of the SMB (Small Minus Big) portfolio described earlier.
For a similar reason, fundamental/price ratios (such as earnings-to-price or book-value-to-
price) are positive return predictors. Indeed, scaling of price by a fundamental measure can
improve return predictability, because a firm can have high price for fundamental reasons,
not just because of mispricing. These effects can explain the performance of the HML (High
Minus Low) book-to-market-based portfolio described earlier.
A second key implication is that the amount of mispricing will be constrained by the
return factor structure, meaning the set of random variables (“factors”) that affect the re-
turns of different stocks, and the sensitivities of returns to the different factors. The factor
structure affects how risky it is to arbitrage mispricing. When all investors are overconfident,
relatively extreme mispricing is feasible. However, when there are arbitrageurs with rational
perceptions, high Sharpe ratios become an attractive opportunity to exploit. Such exploita-
tion acts as a constraint on possible mispricing.3 In particular, in the limit as the number of
securities in the market becomes arbitrarily large, it is possible to form portfolios that hedge
away factor risk and exploit any mispricing of residual payoff components. Such portfolios
are virtually riskfree. This implies that, owing to arbitrage activity, there will be almost no
security-specific mispricing (with the possible exception of a small number of securities).
In contrast, to arbitrage the mispricing of a factor (such as the excess return on the market
portfolio, or the return on the HML portfolio, both discussed at Table 1), an investor must
bear substantial factor risk—the risk that the factor portfolio return could turn out high or
low. This implies that in equilibrium, the factor portfolio can remain substantially mispriced.
This contrast between almost perfect arbitrage of idiosyncratic mispricing, but not of factor
mispricing comes in part from the assumption that markets are perfectly liquid. For illiquid
stocks, arbitrage is more costly, so all stocks can have some idiosyncratic mispricing.
In this setting, regressing across stocks on β (the classic risk measure of the Capital Asset
Pricing Model) as well as the fundamental-to-price ratio generally helps disentangle risk
premium versus mispricing effects. However, if overconfidence about signals is extreme and
the fundamental is measured perfectly, even though β is priced, it has no incremental power
to predict future returns. Intuitively, the fundamental-to-price ratio captures both standard
risk effects and mispricing effects—both drive market price down relative to expected future
cash flows. In the limiting case in which the firm-specific signal the overconfident investors
receive is pure noise, and the fundamental proxy is perfect (the best rational forecast of future
3More precisely, the flow of wealth from irrational to rational investors becomes arbitrarily large, which
clearly is not sustainable.
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cash flows), β does not provide any additional useful information to predict returns. The
fundamental/price ratios will eliminate β in a multiple regression when forecasting the cross-
section of future returns. This implication is consistent with empirical studies mentioned
earlier in which book-to-market eliminates β in predicting returns.
Finally, this model displays excessive disagreement, because overconfident investors insist
on relying too heavily on the signals they possess, and then will trade against rational
arbitrageurs who do not possess those signals and do not overweight the signals’ precision.
An excessively large volume of trade will result. In this way, overconfidence helps to explain
the remarkably high volumes of trade in liquid securities.
3.5 Summing Up: Linking the Models to the Trading Strategies
We have already discussed how the models in this section can explain the strong performance
of the first four trading strategies summarized in Table 1. We close this section by discussing
whether overconfidence can help explain the performance of the remaining three trading
strategies: ACR (long on low-accrual firms, short on high accrual firms), BAB (long on low-
beta stocks, short on high-beta stocks), and IVOL (long on stocks with low idiosyncratic
volatility, short on stocks with high idiosyncratic volatility).
We begin with the strong performance of the BAB and IVOL portfolios, which reflects,
respectively, the underperformance of stocks with high systematic and idiosyncratic risk.
As noted earlier, in a model such as that of Miller (1977) in which there is both investor
disagreement about firm value and short-sales constraints, irrational optimists dominate price
setting. This implies that when investors disagree more about a firm’s future prospects, that
firm will be more overpriced and thus will earn lower returns on average. Overconfidence
provides a natural explanation for the irrational tendency for investors to be too insistent
in disagreeing, and for optimists to fail to fully adjust for the fact that there are pessimists
who have been sidelined by short-sale constraints. High risk firms have greater scope for
overconfidence and disagreement, so we expect this source of overpricing to be greatest
for high risk firms. In these ways, overconfidence provides a natural explanation for the
idiosyncratic volatility and betting against beta effects.
ACR (the accrual anomaly) is usually understood as arising from limited investor atten-
tion. The earnings for a firm are the sum of its cash flow and accrual components. The cash
flow component of earnings is a much more favorable indicator than the accrual component
of high future profits (Sloan 1996). Investors who do not delve into earnings to evaluate
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these components separately will tend to overvalue firms with high accruals and undervalue
firms with low accruals.
In our view, overconfidence is an important part of understanding return anomalies that
are usually attributed solely to limited investor attention. Limited attention has a much
bigger effect on price if the investors are overconfident and so fail to recognize that the
information they are neglecting is important. A similar point is made by Kahneman (2011),
who discusses the tendency of people to be overconfident about fast heuristic judgements
(which he calls “System 1”).
4 Cursedness: A Related Approach to Asset Pricing
We make no attempt at a systematic review of behavioral approaches to investment here,
but one alternative, cursedness, is notable for its potential overlap with the overconfidence
approach.4 Indeed, Eyster, Rabin and Vayanos (2013) point out that cursedness can poten-
tially explain several financial economic phenomena that are often understood in terms of
overconfidence.
In cursedness, a game theoretic equilibrium concept developed in Eyster and Rabin
(2005), individuals underweight the information implicit in the actions of others. An ex-
ample is provided by the winner’s curse—the phenomenon that those who win a sealed-bid
auction often have submitted too high a bid, in which the very fact of winning is an indica-
tion that others do not value the object as highly. A sophisticated bidder will make a subtle
inference: if I win, others have information that is more adverse than mine. Someone who
understands the winner’s curse will then tend to bid more conservatively to adjust for the
danger of overbidding, or at times choose not bid at all and thus receive a safe outcome of
zero.
An overconfident individual who overweights his own signal will, accordingly, also under-
weight the information implicit in the actions of others, so the overconfidence and cursedness
approaches yield overlapping implications. However, the cursedness approach does have some
distinct implications. The behavior of an overconfident individual is too aggressive even when
others have no signals; in contrast, cursedness only arises when others have signals that the
4Other behavioral approaches include representativeness and conservatism (Edwards (1968), Kahneman
and Tversky (1972), Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny (1998)); realization utility (Barberis and Xiong (2012));
mental accounting and prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky (1979), Thaler (1985), Barberis and Huang
(2001), Grinblatt and Han (2005)); limited attention (Kahneman (1973), Hirshleifer and Teoh (2003), Peng
and Xiong (2006)); and anchoring (Tversky and Kahneman (1974), George and Hwang (2004)).
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cursed individual might fail to take into account. These distinctions matter for a key ar-
gument of Eyster, Rabin and Vayanos (2013) in favor of cursedness over overconfidence as
an explanation for overly aggressive trading. According to this argument, an overconfident
investor should still trade little, because the investor should recognize that one personal sig-
nal is minor relative to the aggregated signals of millions of other investors (some of whom
might be highly expert). In contrast, a cursed investor ignores those other signals, and hence
trades too readily.
However, an investor could be overconfident about the uniqueness of a personal signal,
not just its quality. Consider a setting where a security’s payoff will be θ = θ1 + θ2, that the
investor believes he has a unique signal about θ1, but that millions of others are observing
signals about θ2. Even with only a moderate level of overconfidence about signal precision,
such an investor may trade quite aggressively, despite being fully aware that there are many
other informed players in the market.
Furthermore, we believe that cursedness does not go far to explain the phenomenon of
aggressive trading. Many financial economists now believe that the great bulk of individual
investors—those who are not insiders, financial professionals, or remarkable amateurs—have
little or no useful private information that would allow them to trade profitably in individual
stocks. But a poorly informed investor who is only cursed, not overconfident, understands
perfectly well that the expected profitability of making a trade is quite small, and moreover,
is costly, owing to brokerage fees, time costs, and risk. These frictions or a modest degree risk
aversion should easily deter aggressive trading by investors who are cursed but understand
that they are ill-informed.
Finally, the empirical evidence summarized earlier in this paper documents short-term
return momentum and long-term return reversal in numerous markets. The model of cursed-
ness in Eyster, Rabin and Vayanos (2013) explains momentum as a pure underreaction phe-
nomenon. As such, it explains momentum but not long-run reversal. The overconfidence ap-
proach, in contrast, explains momentum and reversal jointly as parts of a phenomenon of con-
tinuing overreaction and sluggish correction (Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam 1998).
In summary, we believe that cursedness offers a rich approach for understanding economic
phenomena. We do not, however, see cursedness, at least taken in isolation, as offering an
explanation for the key patterns presented here—excessive trading, short-term momentum,
long-term reversal—that have motivated the use of overconfidence in models of securities
markets.
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5 Conclusion
This essay has two main themes: 1) There are anomalies in financial markets—unprofitable
active trading, and patterns of return predictability—that are puzzling from the perspective
of traditional purely rational models; and 2) models of overconfidence, and of the dynamic
psychological processes that underlie overconfidence, can plausibly explain why these pat-
terns exist and persist.
For those readers who are uncomfortable with an explanation for anomalies based on
imperfect rationality, we would point out that the empirical patterns of unprofitable active
trading and of return predictability are more-or-less agreed upon both by the leading fans
of the efficient markets hypothesis and those with a more behavioral bent. For example, the
data underlying the three- and five-factor models of Fama and French (1993, 2015) suggest
that portfolios can be built that provide high returns can be achieved with relatively low
volatility. The main disagreement is not over the empirical facts described in this paper, but
about what components should be added to an asset pricing model to describe them.
We believe that overconfidence offers a useful component, both because of how it ex-
plains the agreed-upon facts emphasized here, and also because overconfidence promises
to help integrate other elements of behavioral finance theory. For example, some authors
have emphasized the importance of investor disagreement in understanding financial mar-
kets (Hong and Stein 2007). Overconfidence provides a natural explanation for why investors
who process the same public information end up disagreeing so much. Limited investor at-
tention has also recently been offered as an explanation for various empirical patterns in
trading and prices. Overconfidence explains why investors who neglect important informa-
tion would nevertheless trade aggressively, so that such neglect can influence price. In these
ways and others, overconfidence offers a microfoundation for other important building blocks
of behavioral finance models.
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Appendices
A An Alternative Formulation of Overconfidence
As an extension of the overconfidence model in Section 3.2, in this section we explore an
alternative formulation of overconfidence first proposed in Scheinkman and Xiong (2003,
SX).5 In contrast with the specification of the model presented in the main text, in which
the overconfident investor perceives that the investor’s private signal has lower variance than
it actually does, in the SX specification the overconfident investor thinks that the investor
is observing a signal that is highly correlated with innovations in firm value, when in reality
the signal is only loosely correlated with firm value innovations.6
This formulation has the advantage of generating momentum effects without biased-
self-attribution. However, this formulation embeds multiple assumptions about the agent’s
information processing. In standard modeling of overconfidence,7 as presented in Section
3, the agent receives signal which are unbiased, but imprecise, and the overconfident agent
overestimates the signal precision. In this alternative formulation, the signal the agent
receives is biased toward the prior, or to put it differently, it is more strongly aligned with
old information than the individual realizes, and it is this bias that generates the momentum
effect. While overprecision is well documented in the psychology literature, we are not aware
of psychological evidence for the idea that people underestimate the degree to which their
signals are aligned with with old information (after taking into account any overprecision).
To illustrate this alternative formulation of overconfidence, we construct a simple model
like that in Section 3.2, but with a structure that captures the SX structure. As in the model
in Section 3.2, true asset value θ is drawn from a common knowledge prior distribution:
θ = θ¯ + 0, (1)
where 0 ∼ N (0, 1/τ0) The timeline for the model is as follows: at date 0, the agent knows
only the prior distribution, and the price P0 = θ¯. At time 1 the agent observes distinct hard
5This specification of is also used in Alti and Tetlock (2013) and Kelley and Tetlock (2013).
6See pp. 1189-1190, Scheinkman and Xiong (2003)
7By ‘standard’ we mean the signal as truth plus noise, as used in the models of Kyle and Wang (1997),
Odean (1998), Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (1998), Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (2001),
Hirshleifer and Luo (2001), and others.
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(h) and soft (s) signals of the form:8
σh = θ + h
σs = θ¯ + η0 +
√
1− η2 s. (2)
At time 2, θ is revealed and P2 = θ.
h and s are mean zero, normally distributed with precisions τs, and τh.
9 However, SX
model the investor’s overconfidence as leading her to believe that the private/soft signal is:
σs = θ¯ + ηC0 +
√
1− η2C s, (3)
where ηC > η.
To see how this is distinct from the standard overconfidence setting, note that equations
(2) and (3) can be rewritten as:
σs = ηθ + (1− η)θ¯ +
√
1− η2 s
σs = ηCθ + (1− ηC)θ¯ +
√
1− η2C s
In the setting in Section 3.2, overconfident investors underestimate the variance of s. In
contrast, in this setting an “overconfident” investor (with ηC > η) not only underestimates
the signal variance, but also overestimates the extent to which σs is pushed away from the
prior θ¯ and towards the true value of θ. As a result, when the agent’s overconfidence is of
this form, P1 will be pushed away from θ and towards θ¯.
To better illustrate the importance of this assumption, consider an extreme setting where
η = 0, implying σs = θ¯ + s—so that the informed investor’s signal is equal to the mean
of the prior distribution plus pure noise. However, assume that the investor is severely
overconfident, meaning that ηC = 1, implying that the investor believes that her signal is
unbiased, and infinite precision — i.e., σs = θ. Thus, P1 = θ¯, while the rational expected
time 2 price, conditional on the hard signal σh, is:
ER[P2|σh] = ER[θ|σh] =
(
τ0
τ0 + τh
)
θ¯ +
(
τh
τ0 + τh
)
σh.
8Alti and Tetlock (2013) label these signals as hard and soft, rather than as public and private.
9In the Section 3.2 specification, the public and private signals were revealed at times 1 and 2 respectively.
Here, they arrive simultaneously at time 1.
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Thus,
ER[r12|σh] =
(
τh
τ0 + τh
)
(σh − θ¯).
Thus, in a setting where the investor both underestimates the noise variance in the
private signal, and underestimates the extent to which the signal is shrunk towards the
prior, there will be underreaction to public information signals, and a form of public-signal
linked momentum will result. However, if all signals are unbiased—i.e., the true value θ plus
noise—then additional model structure is necessary to generate the observed underreaction
to public information, and price momentum.
How consistent is are the psychological evidence on overconfidence with these two possible
specifications? The SX specification assumes a combination of overestimating signal precision
(as in the standard overconfidence approach) and a distinct second bias of believing (above
and beyond the effects of any misperception of signal precision) that the realized signal
is closer to the true value than it really is. We view the psychological underpinning of
overconfidence (that people think they are good at generating high quality signals) and the
psychological evidence of overprecision as more supportive of the first bias than the second.
B A proof that in the Model 2 setting, E[R2,3|sB] = 0
From the equation:
P2 =
1
τ0 + τˆV + τB
(
τ0θ¯ + τˆV sV + τBsB
)
,
E[P2|sB] = 1
τ0 + τˆV + τB
(
τ0θ¯ + τBsB + τˆVE[sV |sB]
)
. (4)
However,
E[sV |sB] = E[θ|sB] = 1
τ0 + τB
(
τ0θ¯ + τBsB
)
.
Substituting this into equation (4) yields:
E[P2|sB] = 1
τ0 + τˆV + τB
(
τ0θ¯ + τBsB
)(
1 +
τˆV
τ0 + τB
)
.
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